IAIN
BENSON
OPENING REMARKS
I'd like to extend my
thanks to the organizers of this event for bringing together different people
from different areas of British Columbia society.
It's my experience that too little of this kind of discussion occurs, and
I'd like to see this become a much more frequent part of our discussion,
particularly in the education area. I'm
very pleased to see Craig Jones here and Ms. Sims from the BCTF.
When I was at the Labour Relations Board, I was struck with how infrequently some of the political philosophical issues actually got any kind of broad public discussion, and it seemed to be that in many cases basically different councils would take potshots at each other across the trenches, and I didn't think that did a lot of good for the analysis and it certainly didn't do any good for the citizens of British Columbia.
This issue that we have
been asked to address today, conscience protection in public education, is
extremely important. It's always
been important. Writing in 1775, Thomas Paine, who was one of the great
Enlightenment thinkers that was influential in the United States particularly
but elsewhere as well, said that spiritual freedom is the root of political
liberty.
And it seems to be that
when you look at the rise and fall of different countries, often how they deal
with the views of what we could broadly describe as spiritual views of the
populous is, in some respect, a litmus test of how free they are.
And we talk a lot about
freedom in Canada, and we talk a lot about diversity and pluralism, but it's my
view that in some respects Canada is developing its own unique form of
oppression in a velvet glove, particularly with respect to genuine diversity,
practical diversity in such large public areas as education.
It's a temptation in any
area. Healthcare also at the moment
is struggling with how to accommodate diversity views, and Mr. Jones in his
opening excellent quick overview touched on that as well.
I just spoke at a medical conference in Alberta last weekend and had some
very interesting discussions with two people in particular, one a recent ob/gyn
graduate and another a pharmacist, both of whom had experienced this velvet
glove oppression in different ways. And,
indeed, right now the whole question of how medicine is going to accommodate
those who oppose particular practices remains to be seen.
Craig mentioned the
dilemma of people in the small town and whether there's the desire of citizens
to have access to certain medical services, whether it's the abortion procedure
or a pharmacist issuing emergency contraceptions.
How we're going to deal with that is extremely important because in some
respects there's an element of -- in a sense it's not civil disobedience, per
se, but it's a situation in which the freedom of conscience of professionals can
lead to a situation of which people simply can't get what they want unless
people are forced to do things that are fundamentally opposed to their deepest
beliefs. And it's the
"unless" there that concerns me because, in some respect, if you want
to talk about conscience and you look at the nature of some of the regimes that
have developed over the past couple of hundred years, ask yourself where would
you have been in a society that started to, in your view, go wrong.
What would have happened
if people at different points within the Weimer regime stopped to play along
with what they saw as the rise of unjust actions against various groups within
society? How did that society
tolerate or not tolerate people saying they weren't going to go along with
things they thought were objectionable? Well,
no society can put itself above rejection, above the views of citizens, who say,
"I don't want to do this. I'm
fundamentally opposed to this."
And the question of how
we're going to deal with that kind of a view in public education or in medical
care is one that we've got to pay some attention to. Why? Because I think we're getting to the point now where our
rhetoric of diversity is starting to be tested because we no longer have the
homogeneous population that we once may have had.
I'm not sure that
immigration is the reason for this. I
think that there are core moral principles within all the world traditions.
But it's really that there's been within all moral traditions a kind of a
break of confidence with respect to there being objective moral goods at all so
that whether one is from a Hindu tradition or Islamic tradition or from
countries of all manner of ethnic background there are those within each
tradition who would line up with the idea of objective moral goods and those who
would line up with the idea of individual moral views, kind of individualism or
there being truths that are only created by the individuals.
If you like values which
are "you have your values, I have mine" versus the more objective
notion of virtues, all the world traditions have some notion of virtue.
It's the modern and post-modern period that has developed to a fine point
this language of values in which “you have yours, I have mine”.
George Grant the Canadian philosopher once said that “values language
is an obscuring language for morality used when the idea of purpose has been
destroyed - - and that is why it is so wide-spread in North America.”
I think we need to revaluate completely this “values” language
approach in all aspects of society including public education. It is simply insufficient for serious approaches to personal
relationships, community or citizenship itself. To learn the contents of what “virtues” and objective
principles are is far superior to being told to work out what your own
“values” are. Values are not
simply “second rate virtues” they are not necessarily even “virtues” at
all. That is why the current public education Career and Personal
Planning (CAPP) programme in BC is so deficient. It is not adequate for the “community building” and
“character formation” that so many realize we need as a society. Virtue and principle are superior to the ambiguity of
“values.”
What does this all mean
for public education? Well, I think it raises some very difficult questions,
particularly with respect to the controversial issues. Most particularly we're
seeing in the cases of the obvious ones to what extent homosexuals will have
their particular views incorporated in public classrooms or not.
Both the Surrey School
Board decision, of the BC Court of Appeal which
came down on September 20th, 2000 and which I don't need to tell
people in this auditorium about, and the Trinity Western University case, which
was argued on November 9th in Ottawa, raised generally important questions about
accommodation and diversity of views. They also raised some extremely important
categorical definitions such as the meaning of “secular”.
In a nutshell, the Surrey decision has killed any notion that the
“secular” means “free from religion” in BC.
It overturned such an interpretation by the trial judge three judges to
zero. It is now the law in BC.
And that law says that the “secular” does not “privilege” an
atheist or agnostic view of morals in schools.
So we are going to have to learn the proper place for moral disputes - -
and how to accommodate religion and conscience beliefs of all sorts whether they
are religious or not. Religion is
not going to be driven out by an atheistic definition of the “secular.”
I was educated in a high
school in Victoria on Vancouver Island, and I was taught, as many in this room
were, that the secular is a non-religious realm, that that's a realm where
religion is out and somehow it's related to the separation of church and state.
I have come in recent
years to realize that that's entirely wrong.
I wrote an article about it in the recent issue of the UBC Law Review
[“Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the “Secular”” in University of
British Columbia Law Review, Special Issue “Religion, Morality and Law”,
No. 33, 2000 pp. 519 – 549]. And,
in fact, I was very pleased to see that the three judges of the Court of Appeal
in Surrey School Board agreed with what I could describe as my new view of the
secular.
What is the new view?
Just that the secular must necessarily be understood as a realm of
competing belief or faith claims. Everybody
believes. Everybody's a believer.
The question is what do they believe? Religious believers believe a whole
series of things that emerge from their religious assumptions or commitments.
Atheists and agnostics are also believers.
Their beliefs, however, don't emerge from a particularly religious set of
assumptions. But in terms of
fairness and distribution within society, why should the only beliefs that
dominate culture be those that are from atheistic or agnostic presuppositions?
There's no good reason for that. So
the secular cannot be construed fairly as a non-religious realm.
The separation of church
and state is a valid distinction, but it's entirely different as a distinction
from the separation of religion from culture.
Too often the jurisdictional distinction, “church should never run the
state” (and vice versa) , is used as an argument against the valid role of
religion within culture. There's
no reason why I as a lawyer or someone else as a politician or someone else as a
public school teacher shouldn't have their personal religious convictions
animate what they think is most important about their lives, including their
work. Only an atheistic
interpretation of the “secular” (now rejected by BC’s highest court) would
support that. In fact, that kind of
interpretation, far from being “liberal” and “free” as demanded by the Charter
of Rights, is the ideology of “secularism.”
It makes no sense at all
for religious teachers to be told to park their very purpose and meaning and
existence at the door of the school. What
they're told they must do, however, is to integrate themselves fully into the
classroom, be also fully respectful to those people who don't share those
beliefs. So it's a much richer
respect for diversity of views than sometimes we speak about when we speak about
the secular as being a non-religious realm.
There is, as author Lois
Sweet described in a book called God in the Classroom, [(Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1997) p. 211]
the very real risk of a kind of rise of what she called “secular
fundamentalism”. I'd like to term that secularistic fundamentalism because, as
I said, I don't believe that the secular realm is properly understood to be
non-religious.
Parents' rights are
going to be playing a much more important role, I think, following the Surrey
School Board decision because in that case the three judges of the BC Court
of Appeal affirmed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which affirm the parental responsibility to determine the moral and religious
education of the young.
So this question of the
rights of a child versus the rights of the parents, the rights of the family
versus the rights of civil society to guide the education of the young, this
raises a very difficult series of interlocking clashes or balances that need to
be struck. It's not a simple thing
at all.
But we do a tremendous
disservice to families if we exclude parents from public education.
And it seems to me that all too often our society, the way public
education is developed, has paid too little attention to the role of family
within society and, in effect, alienated the very people who have delegated
their parental responsibility by excluding them from fundamental decisions about
education, and not just them but teachers as well.
It seems to me that the
principle known in European law as subsidiarity needs to be reaffirmed
and reunderstood, and basically that means that the larger elements within
society exist to further the proper functioning of the smaller elements, not
usurp their roles. So the school
exists to further the proper role of parents as educators, the school board
exists to further the school, and the ministry to further the school board.
You see how that works?
What we've had happen is it's almost been flipped upside down so that everything is driven from the top down, and that's a disaster, not only for parents and students but, it seems to me, for teachers as well because they effectively lose their fundamental relationship with the very people they're supposed to be teaching and the result is that all the “smaller” elements are simply alienated.
So I think I may have
gone over my time, but those are some of the points I wanted to raise, that
really the question today is accommodation of differing beliefs, and remember
that the root of the term accommodation is the Latin term commodus which
means to make comfortable, to be comfortable.
Many people at the moment are not comfortable and we have a real, serious
problem facing us of how we can get all sorts of people - - religious and non to
feel more affirmed within culture, gay people to recognize that there are
appropriate ways they have to be affirmed within culture, and so on.
Everybody can't have
what he or she wants in the public sphere.
There's a lot of people around who would like the public school system to
be a kind of separate religious system in which religious doctrines are
inculcated in the young, and I don't think that's appropriate now in the public
system. But so too other groups
have to realize that they can't get everything they want out of the public
system. And part of the
accommodation of diverse views is to recognize where the line seems to be drawn.
Society, in a sense,
exists for the community, and the community exists for the people who live
within it. The individual does not exist for the sake of the state, but the
state for the individual. It seems
to me that that's the right way of ordering the relationship between the person
and the state. Everywhere that
there's tyranny that's developed it's usually when people are viewed as a means
or instruments of the state or of larger groupings.
So to return to Thomas
Paine's understanding it's really in religious or spiritual liberty that freedom
finds its ground. And if freedom of
choice is going to mean anything in our society, it's going to involve a
rethinking of how many of our fundamental relationships are structured, not just
in public education but in all public areas of culture.
Thank you.
IAIN
BENSON
FOLLOW UP:
Just on that last set of
comments, I don't know how there can be “a right to information”?
It may be a subordinate aspect of some kind of new developing right to do
with the rights of children or what have you, but I've never come across as a
legal ground the notion of a right to information.
Right to access to certain kinds of provision perhaps, but even that
sounds nebulous to me. I'm always
nervous about rights that are completely open-ended or that sound to me to be
lacking in any kind of proper grounding-- in what information do I have a right
to? Who decides that? Surely, the
family is the proper determinor of that.
The rights that are
known to the law are the kind that the BC Court of Appeal just affirmed in Surrey
School Board, the parental views on moral questions are entitled to be
respected. Now, if that's a right
(and it certainly is, far from being nebulous like some “right to
information”), then the parental view on moral questions being respected
necessarily entails a limitation of what my children can be given access to, it
seems to me; otherwise, if my child can go into a counselor’s office or into a
classroom and expect to have a right to the information that someone else wants
them to have, then what's happened to the parental rights and rights of the
family?
It seems to me to be
inconsistent to hold at the same time the notion that parental views on moral
questions are entitled to respect and that somebody has an unbridled right to
information. That cannot work. So
what needs to be curtailed at some point then is either the parental view or
this notion of a right to information. And
in terms of legal authority and in terms of the structure of society and in
terms of democratic theory, I would rather have my systems, public education or
healthcare, structured in terms of the parental views on moral questions than on
some undefined right to information.
Interestingly enough,
the same issue came up last weekend at that medical conference I attended with
respect to healthcare in the province of Alberta, where, it turns out, there is
no age of consent legislation at all, and the discussion there turned on
the right to information and medical care.
It transpired that really any child can have a medical procedure if in
the physician's estimation they understand the consequences of the procedure and
there was some discussion about what that might mean.
But it struck me as being potentially very much in conflict with this
notion of parental views and guidance on moral questions.
And it's interesting, a
few years ago I had a case I was involved with in the Supreme Court of Canada.
Because all these Charter cases now have to be analyzed through Section 1, which
is basically the rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms can be
limited in a reasonable way provided that right or freedom is limited only as
can “demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.”
That raises three categories of analyses: one, reasonability, so reason;
second, some notion of freedom; and some notion of democracy.
When you look at the
history of cultures, you discover that freedom is historically meaningfully
related to the preservation of three categories. There's a whole book on this
written by a Russian mathematician by the name of Igor Shafarevich called The
Socialist Phenomenon [New York: Harper & Row, 1980]. He gives a very rigorous historical analysis and he
identifies a particular thread that runs through all sorts of different types of
socialism throughout history.
He looks at the Jesuits
in Paraguay, and he looks at ancient Babylon, and he looks at all these
different cultures that embodied what he calls chiliastic socialism –
we could call this socialism with a religious fervour.
He says that everywhere socialism, as he defines it, attacks three things
within culture: first, the ownership of private property; secondly, the
institution of the family; and thirdly, the place of religion within a culture.
Now, as we were putting
these materials before the Supreme Court of Canada, it struck me how interesting
that at this time in our history we are the only constitution in the western
world that doesn't protect property rights as a concession to the NDP in Canada,
whereas historically fashionable that's what happened. It's intriguing, whatever
one thinks of it.
Second, we always have
to be cautious; it seems to me, if we want to maintain freedom of democracy.
How are we going to treat the other two categories, the family and
religion? And it strikes me that in
the Surrey School Board case, in the Trinity Western case, and in
various other cases -- Brockie v.Brillinger, the printer case in Ontario,
I don't know if you're familiar with that (it involved a printer ordered to
print materials he found offensive to his religious beliefs, he was fined by the
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal and ordered to print the materials, this case has
caused a great deal of concern and is one to watch as it moves forwards; it is
discussed in detail in a Case Comment by Brad Miller in the Special Issue of the
UBC Law Review referred to above) -- in all these cases, the question of
freedom of religion is now being brought into sharp contrast and sharp
disagreement with these other principles.
At the core, again, is this question of how much contemporary groups expect to gain through the public delivery systems including education. It strikes me that public education can deliver basic notions of “respect” and so we can respect all sorts of different ethnic and religious groups without having to endorse their beliefs. It should be the same with respect for gay and lesbian people. It is asking too much, it seems to me, for these groups to insist upon “welcome” for their “lifestyles” or sexual preferences. This is like religious people asking for acceptance or “welcome” of their deepest beliefs. It is going too far. It is here that adjustments of expectations will have to be made in order for the public realm to accommodate differing views.
Freedom of religion and
the related concept of, if you like, freedom of the family if these are to be
maintained now seem to be facing a challenge from these other rights like the
right to information. That makes me
very nervous, and I guess I'd like to have a discussion around that.
The question would be whether it's sustainable to have at the same time
the role of the family respected and some notion of a right to information of
the children that is determined without input from families.
Thanks.